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ABSTRACT
This paper describes collaborative research commenced early in 1998 and being pursued in cooperation with
the Queensland Government. It extends prior work by Hirschheim, R. & Lacity, M. (Beyond the Information
Systems Outsourcing Bandwagon: The Insourcing Response, 1995; Information Systems Outsourcing: Myths,
Metaphors and Realities, J. Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1993) in the private sector, identifying Government
specific contingencies, with emphasis on the outsourcing relationship and related contract structures.
Comparison will be possible between the prior study and findings in the public sector. Preliminary findings will
be available for presentation at ACIS’98.
Keywords – Outsourcing of IS [EL07]
2 BACKGROUND
The Queensland Department of Premier and Cabinet reported in their 1997 Information Technology /
Information Management Status Report that the Government spent $383.8M on information technology last
financial year.  A further $120M was spent on telecommunications.  The Status Report also notes that 92% of
mainframe services are outsourced to CITEC, a Queensland Government Business Unit (Information Planning
Branch 1997).
A 1997 Commonwealth report estimated that “the IT services 'in scope' for outsourcing represent about half of
the Commonwealth's total IT expenditure of approximately $2 billion”(Commonwealth Report 1997).  It is not
Federal Government policy to outsource but agencies are expected to test the market as a way of achieving
savings of $100M by the year 2001(Budget Paper 2 1997-8).  It is of national interest to examine this
phenomenon and maximise its effectiveness as Government outsourcing grows to a potential $1 Billion Dollar
business.
2.1 Outsourcing in Government
There has been consistent growth in the outsourcing of information systems by the Queensland and Federal
governments over the last few years (Budget Paper 2 1997-8, Information Planning Board 1991-8).  Recognising
this trend, in 1997 the Information & Procurement Division of the Department of Public Works and Housing, in
conjunction with Queensland Health, commissioned a project to develop best practice guidelines for the
outsourcing of information systems by Queensland Government agencies.  At the end of 1997, the Division
published a three part publication entitled "The Queensland Government Guide to Best Practice in IT
Outsourcing" (Information & Procurement Division 1997).  This publication provides high level guidance in
three stages of outsourcing: (1) Making the Decision, (2) Establishing the Arrangement, and (3) Implementing
and Managing the Arrangement.
The Queensland Government aims to further develop these guidelines for second generation and more
sophisticated users, thereby increasing control and independence of outsourcing projects and reducing
development costs.
2.2 Aims of the Research
The aim of this research is to build on previously identified theoretical models and academic case study analysis
undertaken in the area of outsourcing in the private sector in order to develop practical advice and tools for use
within Government.
The research questions to be explored are:
1. How does public sector outsourcing differ from private sector outsourcing?
2. What are the principal business drivers in public sector outsourcing?
3. What is the best contract / relationship structure for Government and Vendor?
4. When should insourcing be considered in Government?
5. Does outsourcing constrain Government organisational flexibility?
The Queensland Government aims to use the research results to advise its IT&T management, and management
of other Government jurisdictions, through a series of practical publications:
1. Developing and Evaluating Outsourcing Proposals in Government;
2. Precedent Contract Templates for use in Government Outsourcing Arrangements;
3. Best Practice advice across a range of Outsourcing issues including optimising the vendor /
agency relationship;
4. IT efficiency opportunities which result in Insourcing bids winning Outsourcing contests.
3 RELATIONSHIP OF PROPOSED WORK TO PREVIOUS WORK
Prior research has addressed several factors in outsourcing.  This research has ranged across the outsourcing
lifecycle however little or no attention in previous studies has been directed at the public sector.
In the early 1990’s Rudy Hirschheim and Mary Lacity conducted a series of two, extensive multiple case studies
of first, the outsourcing (1993a; 1993b; 1993c; 1994a; 1994b; forthcoming:a) and second, the insourcing (1995a;
1997; 1998; forthcoming:b; 1995b)  experiences of 13 and 6 large, private sector U.S. organisations respectively.
They based their work on two principle theories:  Williamson's Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) and Pfeffer's
political model.  Transaction Cost Theory was used because a main determinant of executives outsourcing
decisions was expected savings from the arrangement.  Pfeffer's political model was used to provide a balancing
view based on the political aspects of decision making in organisations.
Further work was conducted by Alpar and Saharia (1995) on Transaction Cost Theory to examine ways of
stratifying the type of arrangement (contract) that best suits individual outsourcing transactions.  They look at
features such as the specificity of the service / product including site specificity (resource immobility), physical
asset specificity (technological advantage) and human asset specificity (know how).  These elements in
conjunction with coordination costs (search, contracting and coordination costs) assist in the determination of the
contract form.  The current contract form in Queensland is a standard set of terms and conditions that do not
address specific outsourcing issues.  The commercial consequence of this is that the Queensland Government,
like other jurisdictions, is sometimes reliant on the vendor to draft the contract or is drafting in the absence of
available precedents.
There has been some attention to the decision to outsource, insource or smartsource and the choice of
outsourcing vendor.  Loh and Venkatraman (1992) examined both the business and IT perspectives.  In essence
what they and others consider in detail, is what drives a business to make an outsourcing decision.  Business
drivers in Government can differ from those that occur in private enterprise.  In particular, Government must
carefully consider the social and economic impacts of an outsourcing arrangement from a whole-of-state
perspective.
Lacity and Willcocks (1995) look several reasons why information technology outsourcing decisions are unique.
These include 1) Information Technology evolves rapidly 2) the underlying economics of information
technology changes rapidly 3) the penetration of information technology to all business functions is ubiquitous 4)
the switching costs to alternative information technologies and information technology suppliers is high and 5)
customers are often inexperienced with information technology Outsourcing.
Earl (1996) considered the Risks of Outsourcing IT and developed a model of selective outsourcing to again
support the outsourcing decision.  Grover, Chong and Teng (1996) look at the types of outsourcing and conclude
that success most often occurs when it involves the functions of ‘systems operations’ and ‘telecommunications’.
They also examine the relationship issues of outsourcing partnerships such as trust, cooperation and
communication and the effect these have on the success of the outsourcing arrangement.  An issue to be
considered in this study is whether the outsourcing of particular functions is somehow contingent upon the
specific government environment eg. its size within a marketplace and the consequential effects of its
outsourcing policy (and execution) within that marketplace.
Clemons and Reddi (1994) looked at the Impact of IT on the degree of outsourcing, the number of suppliers, and
the duration of contracts.  These authors like many others use Transaction Cost Analysis to investigate how
outsourcing should be best structured to maximise its benefits and minimize costs.  In decomposing transaction
costs they examine the effects of coordination cost, operations risk and opportunism risk in outsourcing
arrangements.  From this analysis they model the profit function for different modes of economic organisation.
The principle body of work upon which this project will be based is that conducted by Hirschheim and Lacity
(H&L).  Important issues arising from their work need to be explored, to ensure that Governments are managing
their information technology and telecommunications investment responsibly.   Hirschheim and Lacity suggest
that in certain circumstances, IT&T services are more effectively provided internally (insourced).  It is thus
important to identify contingencies suggesting insourcing over outsourcing in the Government context.
Hirschheim and Lacity suggest that consideration of business drivers should shape the outsourcing agreement.  It
is thus important to identify these drivers in government and to consider their political and economic feasibility.
Hirschheim and Lacity further suggest that an arms length contract is the best contract structure as opposed to
"partnerships with vendors" which have not worked well in the private sector.  The issue thus is what structure a
contract should take and the consequences of its structure to ongoing management.  Lastly Hirschheim and
Lacity observe how outsourcing can constrain organisational flexibility.  This begs the question “how will
outsourcing affect the delivery of Government services to the community?”
Though Governments world-wide are moving to become more business-like, the preceding discussion has
suggested the existence of differences between the private and public sectors that may influence outsourcing
arrangements.  It is thus necessary to identify these key differences and to understand their implications for IT&T
outsourcing in Government.
The following is a precis of the work by Lacity and Hirschheim (1993a; 1995a) based principally on
Williamson's Transaction Cost Theory and Pfeffer's political model with reference to issues potentially unique to
Government. Reference is also made to Gable’s (1992b) work on consultant engagement success factors,
particularly as regards selecting the outsourcer and managing the relationship.
3.1 Business Drivers for Outsourcing
The business drivers for outsourcing within an organisation can be financial, commercial, technical or political.
An objective of this research is to evaluate whether the business drivers are the same in the public sector as they
are in the private sector.  If they are not the same, it is important to identify the differences, why the differences
exist, and what effect these differences have on the outsourcing vendor, the outsourcing industry and the business
relationship between the vendor and Government.
Gable (1997) likens engaging an outsourcer to consultant engagement. He suggests that “Prior to commencing
selection, clients should carefully consider their reasons for outsourcing expert assistance. The appropriate
selection criteria in some situations will be contingent upon these Reasons. The clearer the client's understanding
of their Reasons, the less likely they are to deviate from the more important criteria in selection.”
Financial - The popular press has provided an impression that Outsourcing can lead to cost savings in the
Information Systems function.  The propensity to only report positive stories about an area is often because
negative reports are generally unavailable to the popular press. Companies wish to keep their failures to
themselves.  This creates an impression in a decision-maker’s mind that costs in IS are avoidable through
outsourcing.
Loh and Venkrataman (1992) propose that a high level of business cost structure may motivate a firm to review
the overall structure reflected in its physical infrastructure (such as plant and equipment), including its IT
infrastructure.  Some arrangements are not solely motivated by cost.  Where cost is an important driver,
transaction cost analysis is an appropriate tool to both benchmark current costs and measure resultant cost
efficiencies from outsourcing.  Applegate, Mcfalarne and MckKenny (1996) suggest that outsourcing is
appealing because it offers an opportunity to liquefy the firm’s intangible IT asset, thus strengthening the balance
sheet and avoiding a stream of sporadic capital investments in the future.  In Government, funds from the sale of
equipment may not be made available to the agency that is outsourcing for use in its other areas.  This differs
from many private sector models and emphasises cost saving in government business cases.
Commercial - Massachusetts Blue Cross and Blue Shield’s decision  to outsource to EDS was triggered by the
failure of three major system development projects (and losses of tens of millions of dollars).  It saw Outsourcing
as a way to fix a broken department. (Applegate et al 1996).
Many outsourcing initiatives driven by management derive from a focus on core competencies.  In the
Queensland Government this has extended to segregating the entire corporate services (including IT&T)
component of an organisation into a separate unit (The Corporate Services Agency) which services more than
one agency (Primary Industries, Natural Resources).  Separating information services from an organisation and
introducing open competition for those services can change the IS function from a cost to a profit centre and
drive efficiency through competition.  Outsourcing the function is a variation of this type of arrangement.
Technical - Large outsourcing vendors are able to entice considerable IS skills into their organisation.  Also,
outsourcing companies may employ newer technology than that of their prospective client organisation.  Better
skills and modern infrastructure will attract some agencies to outsource IS functions that are perceived to be
lacklustre. TAFE Queensland have entered a ‘partnering / outsourcing’ arrangement with Unisys to introduce
and improve business process re-engineering skills in the organisation.  CITEC regularly employ private sector
technical people as contractors because of restrictive pay structures in Government.
Alternatively, an organisation may outsource a legacy function while the current in-house staff are up-skilled on
new technologies which replace that legacy function.  This is a common strategy when implementing large new
financial systems.
Political - An outsourcing tender usually entails benchmarking the internal operations to support the evaluation
of outsourcing proposals.  An IS manager under pressure may bias this process to demonstrate that outsourcing
the IS function will result in negative returns to the organisation (Hirschheim & Lacity, 1993a; 1995a).  In
Government decisions may be politically driven to enhance the IT&T industry or increase employment in a
particular region. These short term strategies can be at the expense of marginally higher costs in a particular
government function.
Gable (1997) further suggests that “Consultants (outsourcers) too should attempt early in the proposal process, to
identify the client's true reasons for seeking outside assistance. A clear understanding of the client's Reasons will
help the consultant to focus their proposal on the relevant or more suasive selection criteria. The client's main
Reasons should influence the consultant's proposed approach. An accurate perception of why the client is
seeking outside assistance will help to maximise the "consultant's understanding of the client's needs" (the
selection criterion rated most important by all respondent groups in Gable’s study (1997)). An appreciation of the
client's views on selection criteria is of obvious value in marketing consulting (outsourcing) services. An
improved understanding of client Reasons also can help the consultant (outsourcer) to anticipate and better
understand problems encountered, and to work toward improved levels of client satisfaction. Similar items to
those employed in Gable’s study, perhaps administered at the start of the outsourcing engagement or verbally
administered during preparation of the RFP, may be useful in achieving several of the above objectives.
3.2 Choosing a Supplier
Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny (1996) propose that Outsourcing technically immature activities engenders
significant risk.  Ironically these are precisely the IT activities that many senior executives want to outsource.
This decision often proves disastrous because the companies are not in a position to negotiate sound contracts.
Further they suggest that a second important technical consideration is the degree of integration with other
business processes and technical systems.
Saarinen and Vepsalainen (1994) propose a Procurement Principle for general information systems composed of
three strategies.  Their third strategy states that speculative investments are best left for internal development by
innovators.  This strategy would suggest that speculative or high risk developments should be Outsourced with
care.
Procurement is strongly controlled within Government within existing policy frameworks such as the
Queensland Government State Purchasing Policy (1991).
3.3 Setting Up The Outsourcing Arrangement
The purpose of formalising an outsourcing arrangement into a contract is to record the current and future
responsibilities of each party and to propose various courses of actions under either predicable or unforeseen
circumstances.  A change in Government can bring about wholesale re-structuring of Government departments,
affecting the scope of some outsourcing arrangements and causing several contract variations.
The Queensland Government has found over the last six years of telecommunications facilities management with
start up firms that promises made during the contracting period are not always operationally feasible.  Under a
tight contract regime, there is the flexibility by the outsourcing organisation to forgive contractual obligations.
Where, on the other hand, fundamental obligations were not considered in the contract development, the
outsourcing vendor comes cap in hand looking for additional fees (Opportunism).
Applegate et al (1996) say that a rigid deal that made sense at the beginning may make less economic sense three
years later and require adjustments to function  effectively. Further, they suggest that no matter how much detail
and thought go into drafting the contract, the resulting clauses will provide imperfect protection if things go
wrong.  Indeed, the process of contract drafting (where one gains insights into the other’s values) is likely to be
more important than the contract.
3.4 Implementing The Outsourcing Arrangement
The implementation of an outsourcing arrangement encompasses a range of technical, human resource and
business issues associated with the functions to be outsourced. Very importantly a recent court case Stones v
Simplot (1996) demonstrated that employees who are transferred to an outsourcing vendor without the proper
processes can give rise to a case of unfair dismissal against the outsourcing organisation.
Pinnington and Willcock’s (1995) research findings suggest that IT directors need to investigate and agree with
human resource directors the role of ‘home grown’ IS/IT specialists and business managers in the company.
Once this is done, it will be easier to plan the competence development of IT specialists and IS/IT business
managers and to formulate a coherent strategy for IS/IT outsourcing and insourcing.
If the functions are already outsourced to a greater or lesser extent, the outsourcing organisation is conducting a
'transition out' from the legacy providers at the same time as conducting a 'transition in' to the new provider. The
legacy provider could be less motivated than the new provider to transfer the functions resulting in cut-over
issues.  Little work has been discovered covering the transition issues from legacy providers to new providers.
Recently the Queensland Government made a policy statement covering employment security and organisation
change guidelines (Office of the Public Service 1997).  The essence of the policy is that outsourcing should only
be considered where sufficient effort has been made to improve in-house workforce productivity.
The public sector work-force providing the functions have to be given the opportunity to prove their capability to
provide the services.  The response in a recent contract for outsourcing in the Queensland Government is an
indemnity against industrial action arising from or affecting the implementation of an outsourcing arrangement.
3.5  Managing the outsourcing arrangement
Contract Management encompasses some para-legal skills, commercial skills, knowledge of the arrangements
and the ability to put one arrangement in the context of a potentially large number of arrangements.  Whereas the
Queensland Government telecommunications services were totally outsourced to Pacific Star five years ago,
selective sourcing arrangements, consisting of between seven and ten contracts, are now in place to give the
Government more control.
Willcocks, Lacity and Fitzgerald (1995) found in their European and USA studies that an outsourcing contract is
the only certain way to ensure that expectations are realised.  In practice, weak contracting based on inadequate
assessment of a vendor bid, and backed up by poor monitoring systems, not only results in unanticipated higher
costs but can create major problems for client organisations.  They also found parties all too frequently relying
on partnering notions to offset any difficulties arising from loose contracting.
Applegate et al (1996) consider the ongoing management of an alliance is the single most important aspect of
outsourcing success.  They maintain that the four critical factors for success are: 1) the CIO function (in
particular the planning responsibility) 2) Performance measurements 3) the mix and coordination of tasks and 4)
the Customer Outsourcer Interface.
3.6 Managing the Outsourcing relationship
A premise of this study is that the client/outsourcer relationship is centrally important to success. Managing
details of the arrangements is quite different from managing the relationship.  Applegate et al (1996)  say that the
importance of the sensitive interface between the company and the outsourcer cannot be overestimated.
Approximately 10 years ago, Gable  initiated a study, the short title of which is "Consultant Engagement Success
Factors" (CESF) (1991a; 1992; 1991b; 1996; 1997). The CESF study represents inter-disciplinary research
aimed at better understanding client/consultant relations; the consultant engagement process; the IT consulting
industry; factors important to successful IT consulting and management of IT consultants; and factors important
to the successful export of IT consulting services. The CESF study analysed 150 software package selection
projects involving external consultants. Gable suggests that the client/outsourcer relationship is akin to the
traditional client/consultant relationship (1997) and that consulting is a form of outsourcing (outsourcing advice).
Review of the consulting literature reveals a relative dearth of rigorous empirical research on the outsourcing of
IT advice. Yet, current trends toward alternative organisational forms and outsourcing have increased
organisational reliance on external IT consultants who are better placed to remain current on state-of-the-art
technology. Many outsourcing  firms are, or have their origins in, a consulting firm and many would like their
clients to consider them as consultants or partners, when negotiating business.
Hirschheim and Lacity (1993a) suggest the more common client/consultant relationship is inappropriate; that the
outsourcing relationship works best if at ‘arms length’ (1995a).  They view the client/consultant relationship as
being relatively more collaborative - working towards the same ends; whereas the client/outsourcer relationship
represents a “moral hazard” or “zero-sum game”.  This view is contrary to Gables’s findings on client
involvement (1996; 1997) in consultant engagements.
One possible explanation for this seeming contradiction is the need for multiple relationship types in outsourcing
contracts that entail multiple relationships (eg. Benchmarking or BPR versus a long-term provision of
operations).  The nature of the closer collaborative work (ie. the consultant / client style of relationship) may be
based on an alliance or partnership style of contract where risks and rewards are shared.  The provision of
services such as operations or other commodity style services may be better served by the traditional arms-length
relationship.
Regardless, consultants are regularly involved in the RFI/RFP/Proposal process and serve as specialist
intermediaries between clients and the outsourcing vendor. Also, there are many similarities between consultant
management and the management of outsourcing arrangements (Gable 1997). Thus there is a need to better
understand the client/outsourcer relationship.  There is also a need to consider the role of third-party consultants
in the outsourcing arrangement and the management of the client/consultant relationship.  Further, there is a need
to consider characteristics of Government that may moderate these relationships.
4 RESEARCH PLAN
The Queensland Government is facilitating access for the study team to IT management across the sector and
will support their applications for access to IT management in other jurisdictions.  Researchers will interview
outsourcing organisations and will be given access, under strict confidentiality provisions, to relevant
government and commercial documents.  These documents would include policy statements, cost-benefit
analyses, business cases, requests for offer / tenders, evaluation processes, contracts where available, contract
management documents, dispute documents, transition plans and other relevant documentation.  The sensitive
nature of some of these documents may mean that they are only available to the team through the Queensland
Government Partner Investigator.  In certain cases the outsourcing vendor will be invited to provide source
material for the study.
The study includes five main phases. Phase 1 is in progress. The team starts with a strong knowledge and direct
experience of key referent topic areas including IT&T outsourcing, information systems management, consultant
selection and engagement and the consulting process, relationship management and industry/academia alliances.
The study essentially entails a pilot case study followed by a multiple case study in Queensland Government and
aims to extend this to further multiple case studies in other jurisdictions. Case study methods and research
mechanisms as espoused by Yin (1994), Gable (1994) and Miles & Huberman (1994) and as structured by
Pocknee, Fraser & Gable (1997) are being applied.
4.1 Phase 1 – Preliminary Work
 Main activities in this preparatory phase include: confirm access to target case study organisations (ongoing, as
can take time to negotiate); review of the H&L case study database; review of the H&L case study method and
instruments; review of H&L literature-base; update literature-base; confirm study questions and hypotheses; and
detailed project planning.  Most of the research activity will be case studies conducted in the field. There will be
a significant qualitative data collection activity both in the initial investigative stages and in the analysis and
validation phases.
4.2 Phase 2 – Identify Key Issues and Differentiating Factors
 In order to further relate this study to the H&L work the data collection will commence by exploring: Senior
management's views on outsourcing, Business drivers/objectives for outsourcing in Government, the evaluation
of outsourcing bids, the occurrence of insourcing options being adopted, the development and management of
contractual arrangements, and the Government / vendor relationship.
This early work aims to identify key issues and differentiating factors in Government IT&T Outsourcing that will
help to refine the overall research strategy and context. A major output of phase 2 will be a draft case study
protocol, reflecting emphasis on key issues, possible government moderators and specific hypotheses derived
from the theory (transaction cost and political).
4.3 Phase 3 – Pilot Case Study Public Works and Housing
 Next a pilot case study can be commenced with a reasonably complete protocol, ready for testing. Given the
Partner Investigator’s excellent access to information on the Queensland Government’s voice telephony facilities
management agreement, this will serve as the focus of the pilot.
4.4 Phase 4 – Multiple Case Study: IT&T Outsourcing Practices in Queensland and Federal
Government Agencies
In this, the longest phase, the pilot case study will be extended and combined with further case studies of the
IT&T outsourcing experiences of targeted Queensland and other Government agencies.  Early hypothesis testing
through pattern-mapping as data is gathered during this phase, will suggest formal extensions or variations to the
models and possible areas of increased focus.
4.5 Phase 5 – Analysis and Outputs
The study team will collaborate with the relevant areas in the Queensland Government to produce the
aforementioned deliverables to Government.  Lower and more detailed levels of analysis, with closer attention to
linkages between theory-questions-evidence-interpretation-implications, is expected to produce publishable
academic journal and conference articles.  In this final phase, the practitioner and academic deliverables are
revisited in light of findings from detailed analysis.
5   CONCLUSION
Queensland is the first jurisdiction in Australia to view the funding for information technology infrastructure as
equally important to funding for road, rail and ports infrastructure (The Queensland Government) in the
development of the State (Note that this differs from a strategy to grow the information industry locally).
The proposed enhanced outsourcing guidelines will be of considerable value to the Queensland Government. The
growth of outsourcing opportunities requires that IT managers further develop their skills to manage the
development and evaluation of outsourcing bids from vendors.  As outsourcing becomes more competitive and
there are more arrangements to manage, contract development skills and tools such as the proposed precedent
contract, will be in demand as will contract management and relationship guidance.
The paper has presented pilot work to date. The extent of this study is dependent upon resources available.
Funding is being sought from both the Queensland and Federal Govenments.
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